With no alternative means of raising the required funds, they pressed the matter further, demanding an additional tribute from the free city of Gades, as well as further loans from both provinces under their control.
The council of Gades, wearied by repeated extortion attempts, expelled Caius Gallonius from the city and declared for Caesar. The merchants of Hispania Citerior, likewise exhausted by continuous demands, mobilised their clients and friends; in several cases entire communities likewise declared openly for Caesar, bringing the province effectively under his control.
As noted earlier, the extraction of additional funds from provinces, free cities, or client communities may produce significant political repercussions, particularly when the affected populations are not favourably aligned. In this instance, the event card A Small Oversight permits the Optimates to remove up to two Loan or Tribute markers, thereby reducing the risk of adverse consequences in subsequent financial demands.
In practice, however, the preceding pressure proved counterproductive. The attempt to raise further tribute triggered a full provincial realignment: Hispania Citerior shifted its allegiance to the Populares under Caesar. As a result, all cities within the province that were previously under Pompeian control and left without garrisons transferred to Caesarian authority.
Consequently, Caesar now holds effective control over the majority of settlements in Hispania Citerior, and thus over the province as a whole.
It is important to distinguish between alignment and control: a province may remain politically aligned with one faction while being physically controlled by the other, depending on the disposition of its cities and garrisons.
In Massilia, with the city garrison now severely weakened after three months of siege, Caius Trebonius judged that the moment had come to demand surrender.
He therefore sent a formal summons to the city council, setting out in detail the superiority of his forces, the completed circumvallation works, the naval blockade, and the impossibility of any relief reaching the city in the foreseeable future. He further emphasized his intention to spare the city and its inhabitants from retribution, should they submit without further resistance.
Confronted with the reality of their situation and reassured by these terms, the Massiliots finally capitulated. The city militia was disbanded, and the Gallic auxiliaries serving in the garrison were permitted to return to their tribes, on condition that they would never again bear arms against Caius Iulius Caesar. Trebonius left one legion as a garrison and proceeded with the remaining two toward Narbo.
The siege of Massilia was among the largest and most protracted of the late Republican period, and it absorbed a significant quantity of manpower and material that might otherwise have been deployed on other fronts.
As in other cases, the city may be under Caesarian control while remaining politically aligned with the Optimates. This distinction carries practical consequences: a substantial garrison must be maintained to prevent unrest, suppress potential revolts, and discourage any reversal of allegiance should the strategic situation change.
In the meantime, Caius Iulius Caesar advanced into Hispania Ulterior. The XIV Legion under Caius Fabius was ordered to march on Toletum and establish a forward supply base, ensuring a continuous flow of provisions to the main army, while Caesar himself prudently advanced toward Corduba, the principal stronghold of the Pompeian forces.
In truth, Caesar’s intent was to present Lucius Afranius with a calculated opportunity: upon learning that the Caesarian forces had been divided, Afranius might perceive this as his best, and perhaps only, chance to force a decisive engagement. Such a battle would allow Caesar to avoid a prolonged pursuit across the vast territories of Hispania Ulterior and bring the campaign to a swift conclusion.
Afranius, though not unaware of the possibility of deception, found himself unable to dismiss the offer. He therefore marched out, leaving no garrison at Corduba, and offered battle with his seven legions.
Caesar, observing that his troops were eager for action, immediately accepted the engagement.
Caius Iulius Caesar, though numerically inferior, relied upon the superior discipline and morale of his legionaries. He advanced with his infantry concentrated in the centre, supported on the right wing by the formidable German cavalry under Quintus Pedius, with the intention of breaking the enemy line at its core.
Lucius Afranius, by contrast, extended his formation along a wider front, placing his veteran troops on the right wing in the expectation of achieving a rapid breakthrough there, and subsequently enveloping the Caesarian line from the rear. He also retained six cohorts in reserve, intended to reinforce the centre should his less experienced recruits prove unable to withstand the initial assault.
Every army possesses a threshold beyond which cohesion collapses and rout becomes likely. This threshold is represented by the Rout Level, which is modified by faction morale, army composition, and the quality of leadership in the field.
The resulting adjusted Rout Level is expressed as a percentage of total army strength, producing the Rout Value: the amount of losses a force can sustain before panic begins to spread and individual units start to break and flee.
In the present case, Afranius’ comparatively large army has a Rout Value of 16, whereas Caesar, despite commanding a smaller force, benefits from superior morale and leadership, resulting in a slightly lower but more resilient value of 15.
Both armies advanced with determination. As Caesar’s legions drew near, the Hispanic slingers in the service of Lucius Afranius discharged a heavy volley of lead bullets, their most effective weapon. Though the legionaries were protected by their shields, some missiles found their mark, and Caesar himself was struck, though not seriously wounded. According to their custom, the slingers withdrew immediately after delivering their volley, avoiding close combat.
Meanwhile, in accordance with Caesar’s orders, the legionaries continued their advance in good order, refraining from casting their pila and preserving them for the decisive moment against the enemy infantry.
The engagement began on Caesar’s left, where Lucius Decidius Saxa had instructed his Gallic skirmishers to hold their ground and delay the enemy cavalry.
As the lines closed, a further volley from the Balearic slingers inflicted additional losses. Then, at close range, both sides hurled their pila and immediately engaged in hand-to-hand combat.
Because the Pompeians had left intervals in their ranks to allow their skirmishers to withdraw, Caesar’s line maintained a more compact and cohesive formation. By virtue of this, and of their greater experience, the veteran legionaries, despite the losses suffered in the advance, began to press hard upon the enemy and throw their line into disorder.
A key concept in melee combat is Weight: the number of men who are actually able to engage in the front rank and, especially in close-order formations, the extent to which rear ranks can effectively support the fight.
By contrast, a disordered mass, regardless of its numerical strength, can bring only a limited portion of its troops to bear at any given moment, greatly reducing its effective combat power.
Classical heavy infantry such as the Greek hoplite, the Macedonian phalanx, and the Roman legion were all specifically trained and organized to maximize this advantage, ensuring that as many men as possible contributed to the fighting at the point of contact.
At the same time, the cavalry under Quintus Pedius fell upon the enemy’s left flank, first casting their javelins and then pressing the attack at close quarters. A portion of the Hispanic auxiliaries, struck with fear at the cries and onset of the German horse, abandoned their position and fled.
On Caesar’s left, the Pompeian cavalry succeeded in routing the Gallic skirmishers; yet, in doing so, they were thrown into considerable disorder by the missiles they had received. Lucius Decidius Saxa, observing this, advanced with two cohorts of the XIV Legion, which he had held in reserve for such an occasion, and repelled the attack.
In the centre, Caius Iulius Caesar, perceiving that the enemy line was wavering, seized the opportunity without delay. Moving along the ranks, he encouraged his men and urged them to press forward before Lucius Afranius could restore order. The legionaries, animated by his presence, renewed the struggle with greater force, broke into the Pompeian line, and drove it steadily backward.
Another key element of tactical combat is Opportunity Activation, which allows a commander with a high Strategic Rating to intervene at a decisive moment and act ahead of the enemy’s intentions.
In this case, Caesar exploited this advantage to renew the assault in the centre at precisely the critical point, denying Afranius the time needed to commit his second line of legionaries and stabilize the front.
With his centre giving way, Lucius Afranius was compelled to intervene before panic spread throughout the line. Placing himself before the fleeing troops and appealing to their sense of duty and honour, he succeeded in rallying a portion of them and restoring a measure of order.
Meanwhile Caesar, observing that his legionaries, though victorious, were fatigued and somewhat disordered, halted the advance and reformed the ranks. The cohorts from the rear were brought forward, allowing those who had borne the brunt of the fighting to recover.
At the same time, Quintus Pedius pressed forward on the right with his Germanic cavalry, routing additional enemy troops and exposing the flank of the Pompeian line.
Perceiving the danger on his left, Marcus Terentius Varro advanced two cohorts from the VII Legion to close the gap and confront the cavalry. The German horse, however, withdrew in good order, avoiding engagement.
Even for a strong cavalry unit, a frontal melee against legionaries is probably a bad idea. Cavalry and skirmishers may be able to avoid a slower enemy trying to engage by pulling back. This could cost an increase in attrition and maybe some pride, but it allows to live and fight another day.
As the course of the battle turned increasingly against him, Afranius shifted his skirmishers to the right, seeking to reinforce Marcus Petreius and, if possible, to break the enemy line at that point; yet this effort produced no immediate result. At the same time, he drew two additional cohorts from his reserve and sent them to strengthen his left flank.
Meanwhile, Caesar continued to restore order in the centre, preparing his legions for a renewed advance. On the right, Quintus Pedius overcame the remaining enemy cavalry and made ready his Germanic auxiliaries for a decisive charge.
As losses mounted and fugitives increased, Afranius perceived that the morale of his army was nearing collapse. He therefore attempted to organize a withdrawal; but, owing to the confusion of the field and the disorder already spreading through his ranks, he was unable to execute it in any coherent manner.
The Pompeian army has already sustained losses amounting to 13 Size Points, with a further 4 likely to be incurred at the end of the turn, enough to exceed its Rout Value of 16.
At that stage, the risk of a general collapse becomes critical, and things can quickly escalate into a rout and a full-scale massacre. Under such conditions, attempting a Retreat During Combat is often the more prudent option. Its success, however, is far from guaranteed: it depends heavily on the Strategic Rating of the commanding general, as well as on the availability of sufficient cavalry to screen the withdrawal and prevent the enemy from turning disorder into destruction.
On Caesar’s left wing, the enemy at last succeeded in bending the resistance of Lucius Decidius Saxa; but the success came too late to affect the outcome. Under the combined pressure of the Caesarian legions in the center and the Germanic cavalry on their exposed flank, the Pompeian line gave way. Their morale collapsed, and the army was driven into rout.
Caesar’s cavalry pressed hard upon the fleeing enemy, inflicting heavy losses and capturing many thousands. The remnants of Afranius’ army withdrew toward the fortified city of Corduba, abandoning their wounded and suffering further losses through desertion along the march.
Caesar, lamenting what he regarded as a needless sacrifice of Roman lives, granted clemency to those who surrendered. The former enemies saluted him as Imperator and were admitted into his ranks.
Overcome by the defeat and the loss of more than ten thousand legionaries, Afranius took his own life shortly after reaching Corduba. Command then passed to Marcus Petreius who, seeing no prospect of recovery and no purpose in prolonging the struggle, surrendered the city to Caesar as he approached.
Thus the campaign in Hispania was brought to an end, and Caesar was free to turn his forces toward Macedonia to confront Pompey.
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